In Damning Report, Chilcot Inquiry Finds UK Rushed To War With Iraq Before It Was A "Last Resort"

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In Damning Report, Chilcot Inquiry Finds UK Rushed To War With Iraq Before It Was A "Last Resort"

July 6th, 2016

Awake Goy

One of the key focus areas of the report is the rationale that Tony Blair gave to the public in taking the UK to war, and whether or not the war was necessary. Upon its release, the report concluded that military action “was not a last resort”, and that Britain chose to join the invasion of Iraq in 2003 before peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted.

The report’s main focus is on what commitments then-Prime Minister Tony Blair gave to then-US President George W Bush ahead of the invasion, and whether or not Blair misled the British public over the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which ultimately turned out to be non-existent. Critically, the report determined that the threat posed by WMDs in Iraq was presented with a certainty that was not justified, and the government failed to achieve its stated objectives of the war.

As summarized by BBC, the main points of the report are:

The UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.

The judgements about the severity of threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – known as WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justified.

Intelligence had “not established beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.

Policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments. It was not challenged, and should have been.

The circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were “far from satisfactory”.

There was “little time” to properly prepare three military brigades for deployment in Iraq. The risks were neither “properly identified nor fully exposed” to ministers, resulting in “equipment shortfalls”.

Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were “wholly inadequate”.

The Government failed to achieve the stated objectives it had set itself in Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict. Iraqi people suffered greatly. By July 2009, at least 150,000

Iraqis had died, probably many more. More than 1m were displaced.

The report sets out lessons to be learned: It found former prime minister Tony Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq; and the UK’s relationship with the US does not require unconditional support.

It said ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge is important. As is ensuring civilian and military arms of government are properly equipped.

In future, all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with rigour. Decisions need to be fully implemented.

More details from RT

The report’s main focus is on what commitments then-Prime Minister Tony Blair gave to then-US President George W Bush ahead of the invasion, and whether the former PM misled the British public over the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which turned out to be non-existent. Others in line for criticism include spy agency MI6 for providing inaccurate intelligence, and military commanders for failing to stand up to Blair. Speaking on the findings of the report, Sir John Chilcot says the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s WMDs was “presented with a certainty that was not justified.” He says “despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated,” and the planning for Iraq after Saddam Hussein was “wholly inadequate.”

Chilcot says the government “failed to achieve its stated objectives.”

After the attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, Blair urged Bush not to take hasty action on Iraq, Chilcot says. But by early December, US policy had begun to shift and Blair suggested the US and the UK should work together on what he described as a “clever strategy” for regime change in Iraq, which would “build over time.” When Blair met Bush in Texas in April 2002, the formal policy was still to contain Saddam. But by then there had been a profound change in the UK’s thinking, Chilcot says.

“The Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that Saddam Hussein could not be removed without an invasion. “The government was stating that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with. It had to disarm or be disarmed.” Britain’s formal decision to invade Iraq, if Saddam did not accept the US ultimatum to leave within 48 hours, was taken by the Cabinet on March 17, 2003. Parliament voted the following day to support the decision.

Thousands of anti-war supporters staged a demonstration in Westminster, demanding “truth and justice” and calling for Tony Blair and others to face the full charges.

“The Iraq War was a disaster, a disaster that began with a lie. If Tony Blair and other politicians responsible had told the truth it would never have happened. A country was destroyed, millions of innocent Iraqis were killed, British soldiers were killed, and terrorism has spread across the Middle East. Those responsible must now be brought to justice.” said Kate Hudson, an organizer of the protest.