Jew World Order

The middle of December 2022 was marked by several important events that were not so much an aggravation of the situation on the Korean peninsula, but rather an important step in implementing the decisions of the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea regarding the development of the DPRK’s nuclear missile capabilities.

On December 15, a ground test of a high-thrust solid-propellant engine with a thrust of 140tf was successfully carried out. For comparison, the US Minuteman-III ICBM is known to develop a thrust of about 80tf in the first of its three-stage engines, while the Hwasong-17 ICBM uses two dual-chamber liquid-propellant rocket engines combined in the first stage, producing a thrust of about 160tf.

According to analysts, a high-thrust solid-propellant engine could enable faster and harder-to-detect ICBM launches to disable South Korean and US missile defenses. Solid propellant offers greater rocket mobility and shorter launch preparation times, is cheaper to produce and is generally more reliable. A solid-propellant rocket can be refueled and stored for a longer period with fewer worries about corrosion. North Korea has already developed solid-propellant tactical ballistic missiles, which could strike most of South Korea, but not Guam or Japan, and so a solid-propellant ICBM is very dangerous for the North’s opponents.

On December 18, the DPRK conducted what the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff described as a launch of two medium-range ballistic missiles. The missiles, fired on an altitude trajectory, flew about 500 kilometers towards the Sea of Japan at a maximum altitude of 550 km. In response, the ROK National Security Council “condemned the Kim Jong-un regime’s continued provocations,” stressing that the North had fired more than 60 ballistic missiles in 2022, a record number of launches in a year.

On December 19, the KCNA reported on “important final-stage test for the development of a reconnaissance satellite.”  Reportedly, an evaluation of “the capabilities of satellite photography and data transmission system and ground control system” was carried out. Preparations for the launch of the first military reconnaissance satellite will be completed by April 2023, says the KCNA.

As confirmation, the North Koreans published captured images of Seoul (areas surrounding the South Korean President’s office in the city center were vaguely visible) and Incheon, as well as photos of the launch of a missile similar to the liquid-propellant Nodong.

All this has caused a flurry of discussion in the South and in the US, and most ROK experts have assessed Pyongyang’s statements with skepticism. In particular, referring to the quality of the photos provided, they stated that the photos seem too “rough” to claim they were taken from a military reconnaissance satellite. According to them, a military reconnaissance satellite requires optical and other sensors with a resolution of about 0.5 meters, while the North has one with a resolution of 20 meters, raising questions about its feasibility. “North Korea appears to be making a mockery (of the South) to show that they can spy on us,” Hong Min, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said.

Other experts said North Korea’s alleged satellite launch was widely seen as a covert test of ballistic missile technology, which North Korea is prohibited from developing under a series of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, but then opinions differed.  A number of experts have suggested that a new medium-range solid-propellant ballistic missile (MRBM) with a range of 1,000 to 2,500 km (an improved version of the Pukguksong series), intended to replace the obsolete liquid-propellant Nodongs and Musudangs, could have been launched on December 18. Others pointed out that the appearance of the launch vehicle strongly resembled that of an obsolete Nodong-type liquid-propellant rocket.

Interestingly, the US military was the calmest and most restrained. On December 20, Pentagon Press Secretary Patrick Ryder said the US does not comment on North Korea’s achievements in developing a reconnaissance satellite, but still considers space technology critical to national security.

The general consensus, however, was that the satellite test was a disinformation operation by the DPRK to sway its adversaries, a pretext for further weapons tests and (of course) “Pyongyang’s reaction to last week’s passage of a UN resolution calling for global efforts to improve human rights conditions in the North.”

Such assessments prompted a sharply negative reaction from the North Korean leader’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, whose December 20 statement took a new height in invective rhetoric. In general, “the issue of developing a military satellite is an urgent priority directly related to the security of our state,” and Seoul should “be careful with its language” and think about what can be done to reduce tensions.

Here are some conclusions. In 2021, at the 8th WPK Congress, Kim Jong-un set some very ambitious goals, one of which (along with tactical nuclear weapons and solid-propellant ICBMs) was to build a reconnaissance satellite. Pyongyang has previously claimed that the Hwasong-17 ICBM launches on February 27 and March 5 were also tests of space reconnaissance satellites, and here two important points must be made immediately.

First, all such satellites are dual-use technology. They can be used both to monitor enemy activities and, for example, to track typhoon tracks, which is an important security element for the DPRK. Second, there is a contradiction of two paragraphs with regard to formally peaceful space. On the one hand, because of UNSC sanctions, the DPRK has no right to launch such ballistic missiles, but on the other, it is declared that all countries have the right to the peaceful exploration of space. In addition, satellite launches are also important in terms of the missile race between the North and the South.

And now the DPRK has taken two important steps. First, a test of the new engine, with the North Korean leader in attendance. Then a test of the ability to put a satellite into orbit. It is clear that these actions have already raised suspicion, and when the satellite is launched it could cause as much hysteria as a nuclear test, which has yet to happen. Moreover, in terms of demonstrating strength and capability, a satellite is a good alternative.

It is likely that we will again witness a confrontation in the UNSC and perhaps even another veto of the US sanctions project by China and Russia. But that is for the future. In the meantime, one can simply congratulate North Korean engineers on yet another success, demonstrating that since the days of the Arduous March, the DPRK has managed to maintain the human, technical and engineering base on which its nuclear missile capabilities are developed today.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia, the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

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