Jew World Order

The main features of domestic political turbulence in Pakistan, outlined earlier in the NEO and overlaid by the impact of the catastrophic flooding, are confirmed by recent developments in the country.

One should not forget Pakistan’s de facto nuclear status, which has stimulated increasing external attention to what is going on within its borders. In particular, US President J. Biden allowed himself some statement on the subject, giving rise to a negative reaction from the Pakistani Foreign Ministry. In relations with India, the Kashmir problem has again manifested itself in a nefarious way.

So the confrontation between the two political factions led by Pakistan’s previous and current prime ministers continued. And in the struggle, each of them is trying to use the judicial branch as a weapon.

As for the recent head of government and leader of the Movement for Justice party, Imran Khan, he has been blamed for some sloppy language at times during speeches at mass events in support of the MfJ and himself. And the question of the actual presence of “something prosecutable” in his words is left to the detractors. In particular, the police saw indications of threats to a female district judge during I. Khan’s public speech on August 21 in defense of Shahbaz Gill, a previously arrested close aide.

On October 1, the Ministry of Interior submitted a request to the attention of current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for written approval of the arrest of I. Khan with a group of associates. But the charge was confined to the illegal use of foreign currency. On October 12, an Islamabad court released I. Khan for a week on bail (under $50) and with an undertaking to attend the trial.

The hesitation of the current authorities is understandable as the former prime minister retains widespread popularity, and his arrest would almost certainly exacerbate an already very difficult domestic political situation. Among other things, its current state is evidenced by the recent murder (while praying in a mosque, remarkably) of a former Balochistan provincial court member by local insurgents, as well as reports of another armed crackdown in the so-called “Tribal Area” of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

It was probably these events that impressed J. Biden, who must have remembered that all this was taking place in a country that possesses a nuclear arsenal.

Meanwhile, in a meeting with journalists from the electronic media on October 13, it was almost the first time that I. Khan publicly and very transparently subscribed to the prevailing view of the decisive role of the military in Pakistan’s internal political processes. In particular, it was said that “someone else” had wielded the real power throughout his tenure as prime minister. This should have been the reason for his inability to collect taxes to fill the state treasury, the widespread wrongdoing by members of opposing political factions and, consequently, the country’s current debt dependence on the IMF.

In this regard, the October 12 acquittal ruling by a Lahore court in the November 2020 indictment of current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and his son Hamza (also a prominent politician) in a prolonged money laundering case totaling about $100 million drew attention.

The current Minister of Defense, Kh.M. Asif, issued a strong rebuttal to Khan’s words, claiming the neutrality of his ministry and the armed forces towards the internal political processes taking place in the country. There were also remarks on two highly topical issues today. First, it was said that the next general election would be “on schedule” (and therefore next summer). Second, the process of changing the army commander will take place in accordance with the current constitution.

The second part of Kh.M. Asif’s statement is particularly significant because for months now, the question of whether the “all-powerful” General Javed Bajwa will finally leave the post and who will replace him has (at least) been as important as all the twists and turns of the “official-public” political struggle.

In the first half of October, President Arif Alvi spoke less definitively, but also more in favor of the incumbent executive on both questions. Nevertheless, there are hints in his statements that I. Khan’s assertion about the role of an “external factor” in his forced resignation as prime minister should have been addressed.

 According to the local media, some “coded” conversations between decision-makers (including high-ranking officials) containing mutual intrigues are being thrown into the public space adding “very dark shades” to the unfolding situation in the country.

The extreme untimeliness of domestic political intrigue stems primarily from the fact that the country was on the brink of an all-out disaster after an unprecedented flood of rivers due to monsoon rains of unparalleled intensity. Speaking at a recent forum in Astana, Prime Minister Sharif estimated their total damage at $30 billion. This figure is surely not a final one (until a month ago it was $13 billion), as the real scale of the disaster is just emerging.

In the same speech, it was suggested (not for the first time, though) that “climate change” was a factor in this catastrophic flooding. Some commentators saw the statement as an implicit demand on developed countries (“as the main perpetrators of climate change”) to compensate Pakistan for the damage caused by the recent flood.

But even if one accepts the (highly questionable) starting position of those who stress the relevance of human activity in such “change”, why would they suddenly focus on the patch that the territory of Pakistan represents on the geographical map of the world? For the author, the viewpoint of the Pakistani inhabitant is more convincing: “We have wronged Allah in some way.”

Pakistanis should be helped in their plight regardless of this (not very clear to themselves) guilt. Everyone should be helped to the extent possible regardless of their “contribution” to “climate change”. It should be noted that Russia is among those who provide it.

Meanwhile, according to an analytical article in the popular publication The Nation, under the telling title “Shrinking resources”, the very serious problems in the country’s financial and economic sphere began long ago, that is, before the current “deluge”. But its consequences are of a particularly menacing nature.

The author of the article referred to used the image of a “fragile and dictatorial thread” emanating from the IMF, on which the country’s economy now hangs. Apparently, in order to ensure that this “thread” is not severed, Minister of Finance Ishaq Dar went to negotiate with the leadership of the said IMF (and the World Bank) in mid-October.

The main component of Pakistan’s set of foreign policy challenges remains the Kashmir problem. It came to the fore once again during the Astana event, in the form of a (not too harsh, but still) tussle between Sh. Sharif and Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Meenakshi Lekhi. The former expressed willingness to improve relations with India, but on the condition that “atrocities end in Occupied Kashmir.” The latter said that the beginning of a bilateral dialogue depended on ending something different, and namely “cross-border terrorism”. All in all, “all quiet on the Kashmir front”.

Finally, it is not without satisfaction to note Pakistan’s (as well as India’s) neutral vote at the current UN General Assembly on Russia’s “annexation of part of Ukraine’s territory”. This once again testifies to the precocity of the hypothesis of a “radical shift to the West” of Pakistan’s foreign policy under the new government.

This has not yet been observed, despite the ongoing domestic political turbulence in the country.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

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