Russia’s war in the Caucasus

July 25th, 2012

FAKE NEWS for the Zionist agenda

Then, on July 15, 2009, Natasha herself was abducted outside her home by armed
men who drove her to the neighbouring Republic of Ingushetia and shot her by
the side of the road. She was 51.

No one has been prosecuted for Natasha’s murder. Russian investigators have
constructed an elaborate – many would say fanciful – theory that she was
killed by Islamist militants. More plausible, albeit unexplored, is the
theory of some of her colleagues that she was murdered in revenge for her
work by Chechen police or security forces, whose transgressions she so
meticulously recorded.

One of Natasha’s beliefs was that when pro-Moscow security forces in Chechnya
tortured or “disappeared” suspected rebels it only provoked rage at the
injustice, and helped to fill the ranks of the Islamist insurgency which has
flared on Russia’s southern perimeter for more than a decade.

Now, more than ever, Russia needs to recognise the wisdom of that assessment,
because the war in the Caucasus is waxing once again. So far this year, at
least 350 people have died in the conflict.

Neither side is innocent. In one of the recent spurts of violence, at the end
of last month, a group of mujahideen entered a mosque in the village of
Karamakhi in Dagestan, the republic worst hit by the insurgency.

The men, who carried assault rifles, took the imam of the mosque – who
professed a different doctrine to theirs – and a parishioner to one side and
executed them. They ordered the believers who were present to carry the
corpses outside. And then they set fire to the mosque.

Such wanton acts are common. Fundamentalists blow up or strafe
government-backed imams, officials and policemen almost daily. Meanwhile,
state security forces stray far beyond the law, using sickening cruelty to
beat information from suspects, or executing alleged rebels rather than
arresting them.

Skirmishes are constant. On July 14, seven militants were killed in one
special operation in Dagestan. Olga Allenova, one of the best Russian
reporters working in the Caucasus, reports a series of suspicious cases of
police shooting young men in their cars after the latter allegedly opened
fire through the windows (although witnesses claim they did nothing of the
sort). In May, several young Dagestani men were abducted, one by men who
appeared to arrive in a police truck.

How to break the cycle of violence? In the last three years, the Kremlin
showed signs of diversifying its efforts to douse the insurgency,
acknowledging that crushing force alone can not be victorious.

The most laudable was the founding in Dagestan in late 2010 of an “adaptation
commission” for boyeviki, the Russian name for rebel fighters.
This commission, organised by local government, began to meet regularly and
examine requests from rebels who wanted to “return from the forest”, or give
themselves up. The commission – made up of spiritual leaders, law
enforcement officers and public figures – has no legal powers but it can ask
a court to show leniency when prosecuting a boyevik.

Critics say the commission – now copied in other republics – has failed to
bring in any big fish from the leadership of the insurgency, which is headed
by the Chechen, Doku Umarov. That is true. But Rizvan Kurbanov, the
Dagestani politician who runs it, argues the process still has worth. “Look
at these guys, are they not serious?” he asked during a recent interview at
his offices in Moscow, as he flipped through a photograph album of a series
of men who gave themselves up; long-bearded youths clutching Kalashnikovs at
a series of forest hideouts. “How about this one with the grenade launcher?
Not serious enough for you?”

To be sure, the commission alone will not stop the insurgency. And it must not
distract from the greater need to stamp out the brutality that drives people
to jihad in the first place. But it’s a symbol, at least, that the Kremlin
is willing to try something other than “force methods”.

That’s why Natasha’s colleagues are now worried by a local attempt to scupper
the commission altogether. Siloviki – senior law enforcement and security
officials – in Dagestan have managed to paralyse its work since April. They
argue the fighters who give themselves up must “cooperate more closely”,
meaning they should inform on their comrades still in the woods in order to
deserve any mercy.

Mr Kurbanov thinks it’s enough that young men are grappled back from a life of
deprivation and killing, and helped to adapt after serving time in prison.
For him, it’s a battle against the propaganda of Islamist recruiters. By
showing that fighters can return without fear of persecution, the message
will spread and others will follow suit, the idea goes.

What happens next is not clear. Unexpectedly, Alexander Bortnikov, the
powerful head of the Federal Security Service, spoke up in favour of the
Dagestan commission and its clones earlier this month. But his subordinates
in the faraway Caucasus could yet ignore the signal.

One man’s word might help. It’s a common misperception that Vladimir
Putin is all-powerful in Russia; often his commands die at the doors
of the Kremlin. But the words of the president can help set a tone. Former
president Dmitry Medvedev made an effort last year when he said the security
forces should stop “fulfilling their quotas with corpses”.

Let us hope Mr Putin will step up and save the commissions. Then he can set
himself another task: finding the scoundrels who killed Natasha Estemirova.