Jew World Order

There is no doubt that today’s world is very different from what it was less than a decade ago, with the military conflict in Ukraine turning out to be a shock that has not only triggered changes in global geopolitics but also in geoeconomics most evident in the form of the way the global oil market is working and how the dynamics of this market have caused old geopolitical alignments to shift. The shift is also an opportunity for many smaller powers to change their tactics and use the scenario for maximum geopolitical gains, including enhancing their global profile from being junior players to becoming major players. One country that seems to perfectly fit this scenario is the oil-rich state of Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, Saudi has apparently developed an ‘oil alliance’ with Russia, is very keen to utilise China’s influence on Iran to rewrite its ties with the latter, and on the other hand, it is also very keen to add to its hard power by bargaining with the US (and Israel) for favours in exchange for developing ties with Israel.

This scenario benefits Riyadh in critical ways. By establishing ties with Russia and China and by normalising its ties with Iran, Riyadh has successfully forced the Biden administration to discard its avowed policy of making Saudi Arabia a “pariah” state in favour of courting the same state for geopolitical purposes. By normalising ties with Iran and by simultaneously pursuing a possible normalisation, at the official/state level, with Israel, Saudi Arabia is trying to position itself as the most powerful state in the entire Middle East – a state that could even become a mediator between Iran and Israel at some point in the future. While this is a distant possibility, for now, the Saudis are focused on something else: there is no denying that Saudi is already a big player in the global economy as one of the largest producers of oil, however, its ongoing bargaining with Washington for recognising Israel is specifically aimed at acquiring hard power potential.

As some reports in the mainstream US media indicate, Antony Blinken’s recent trip to Saudi Arabia was a crucial step towards making a new deal with Saudi Arabia – a deal that also includes Israel. According to the details revealed by US officials, Saudi’s Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) told Blinken that, in exchange for recognising Israel, Riyadh would need much better access to US weapons and Washington’s consent for enriching uranium within Saudi Arabia as part of a civilian nuclear programme. The demand for enriching uranium could very well be Saudia’s first towards acquiring a nuclear bomb in the long run, but the fact that Riyadh is insisting means that it is very keen to translate its oil wealth into military strength – a position that will matter a lot within the multipolar world of the future. Riyadh views itself as a power centre and that its effectiveness will enhance only if it has both economic and military power.

As other reports indicate, Riyadh is already pursuing this deal from a position of strength rather than a position of weakness. As The Washington Report­, analysing an official document, said in one of its reports, MBS is even threatening to inflict serious economic pain on the US. Using coercive diplomacy only indicates the seriousness of Riyadh. At the same time, it also reveals Washington’s vulnerability to the shifting geopolitical dynamics.

While Saudi officials have said that they welcome Washington’s cooperation in the development of the Kingdom’s nuclear programme, they have also indicated that some other supporters of their programme are already bidding for partnership. For Washington, the possibility of Saudi Arabia developing a nuclear establishment with help from its ‘new’ friends, i.e., China and Russia, means that Washington will further lose its influence on Saudi. If Washington, on the other hand, becomes a Saudi partner in its nuclear programme, it will continue to retain significant influence and might even be able to monitor – and block – any possible shifts towards developing an actual bomb. This will, however, seriously upset Israel, which is keen to remain the only nuclear power in the Middle East and maintain the balance of power in its favour. Therefore, when Blinken left Saudi Arabia, the first person he called was the Israeli PM Netanyahu, who is no doubt keen to normalise ties with Saudi Arabia but is nonetheless perturbed by the Saudi demands.

For Israel, the trouble is not only the Saudi demand for Washington’s cooperation in nuclear energy but also the ongoing Saudi-Iran normalisation. A full-scale normalisation – which is already happening, evident from the Saudi foreign minister’s recent visit to Iran and the invitation extended to the Iranian President to visit Saudia – will mean potential Israeli isolation in the region, which could further translate into regional and international pressure on Israel for resolving the Palestinian issue to Jerusalem’s own disadvantage.

Saudi Arabia understands its own position of strength and is very keen to keep it intact. This is evident from its active collaboration with China and Russia. Through them, it is keen to become an SCO member. Through both China and Russia, Riyadh is also eyeing the BRICS. Saudi foreign minister recently said that “The Kingdom remains the BRICS group’s largest commercial partner in the Middle East… The total value of bilateral trade with the countries of the BRICS group increased from $81 billion in 2017 to 128 billion in 2021 and exceeded $160 billion in 2022.”

For China and Russia, none of Saudi’s demands are unrealistic or problematic. For them, growing ties with Saudi only means an increased possibility of a new, alternative world order. However, this possibility haunts Washington, as the new world order would cancel any possibility of Washington’s hegemony or unilateral domination. Washington is keen to prevent this from happening, and Saudi Arabia is keen to exploit the situation to its maximum geopolitical advantage.

Washington, however, is in a quandary, as it has to satisfy two states simultaneously, which means that the chances for the deal to happen between Saudi Arabia and the US (and Israel) are still very low. For Saudi, even if the deal doesn’t happen immediately, it can still achieve its objectives via other means. Therefore, it does not face any immediate need to relax its demands from the US.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Сообщение Saudi: Playing Big Powers for Maximum Gains появились сначала на New Eastern Outlook.

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